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HABEAS CORPUS - PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES - MOTION DENIED FOR
FAILURE To APPEAL CONVICTION DESPITE FAILURE BEING ExcusABLE - Plaintiff was convicted of robbery in a federal district court and, although
represented by counsel, failed to appeal within the statutory ten-day period.
Three months later he filed a motion in the same court under section 2255
of the judicial code1 to vacate the sentence on the ground that the conviction,
because it was based on a coerced confession, was unconstitutionally obtained without due process of law.2 The motion was denied3 and the
denial affirmed,4 in the absence of any attempt to excuse the failure to appeal. On reargument, plaintiff attempted to excuse his failure to appeal by
alleging that neither the court nor his counsel advised him of his right to
an appeal or that such appeal had to be taken within ten days.5 On re128 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). This section provides that a prisoner in custody under
sentence of a federal court may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate,
set aside or correct the sentence and that the motion shall be granted "if the court finds
••• that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the
prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack..••" For most purposes
§ 2255 replaces habeas corpus which will not be entertained if the prisoner is authorized
to apply for relief pursuant to this section unless the remedy by motion appears to be
inadequate. Moreover, cases dealing with habeas corpus proceedings constitute authority
to govern questions concerning the availability of a motion under § 2255, so far as here
relevant. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952); United States v. Edwards, 152
F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1957); see also Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8
F.R.D. 171, 175 (1949). See generally United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954);
Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. REv. 26 (1945);
Peters, Collateral Attack by Habeas Corpus Upon Federal Judgments in Criminal Cases,
23 WASH. L. REv. 87 (1948); Rogge &: Gordon, Habeas Corpus, Civil Rights and the
Federal System, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 509 (1953); Comment, 61 HARv. L. REv. 657 (1948).
2 "[N]or shall any person ••. be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.•••" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 United States v. Hodges, 156 F. Supp. 313 (D.D.C. 1957).
-i This original opinion, which appears as an appendix to the principal case, held
that even if there had been a coerced confession which would constitute a denial of due
process, failure to appeal precluded relief under § 2255 "in the complete absence of any
attempt to excuse the failure to appeal. ••." Principal case at 866.
ti Plaintiff supported this allegation with two affidavits to the effect that he had been
taken to jail immediately after sentence and was thus prevented from conferring with
counsel in regard to an appeal. Principal case at 862.
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argument before the court en bane, held, affirmed, three judges dissenting.
Even if the failure to appeal was excusable, such failure precludes relief by
motion under section 2255 since collateral attack may not be used as a substitute for an appeal. Hodges v. United States, 282 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Section 2255 codifies the general rule that federal convictions are subject
to collateral attack when based on an alleged6 violation of defendant's constitutional rights.7 The majority opinion in the principal case, however,
states it to be "the general rule that the admission of a confession at a plenary
trial is not subject to attack under section 2255 on the ground that the confession was coerced."S No authority is cited in support of this purported "general
rule" and none has been found. On the contrary, the federal appellate
courts have uniformly condemned the use of coerced confessions although
the rationale behind their condemnation has varied depending upon
whether the conviction under attack was obtained in a federal or state
court and upon whether the review was direct or collateral. The courts
have, of jurisdictional necessity, decided both direct and collateral reviews
of state convictions on constitutional grounds, and it is now well settled
that the use by a state of a coerced confession violates the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.9 Since appellate review of federal
convictions need not rest on constitutional grounds, most reversals in federal
cases have been based on either the rule of evidence which excludes coerced
confessions as untrustworthy10 or the federal rule of evidence, established in
McNabb v. United States,11 which excludes confessions obtained during an
illegal detention before arraignment. The fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination has also been cited in dictum in conjunction with
the untrustworthy evidence rule as a makeweight ground for reversal on
appeal of a few federal convictions involving coerced confessions.1 2 To
date the Supreme Court has not been presented vvith a collateral attack of
a federal conviction based upon a coerced confession which would, as do all
state conviction cases, require constitutional grounds to support a reversal.

6 In reaching its decision the court assumed, as it must, that the allegations were
true. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 20D F.2d 666, 668 (2d Cir. 1952); United States
v. Sturm, 180 F.2d 413, 414 (7th Cir. 1950).
7 E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (right to counsel); Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (self incrimination); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889)
(double jeopardy); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (right to jury trial); Ex parte
Bain, 121 U.S. I (1887) (requirement of indictment).
8 Principal case at 860.
9 E.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
10 Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924). See generally 3 'WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
11318 U.S. 332 (1943). The McNabb rule is based, not on constitutional grounds, but
rather on the Court's supervisory control over the federal judicial system. See generally
Comment, 43 VA. L. REv. 915 (1957).
12E.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897); Purpura v. United States,
262 Fed. 473, 475 (4th Cir. 1919).
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The requisite constitutional basis should readily be found, however, either
by reading the due process clause of the fifth amendment as coextensive
with that of the fourteenth and then relying on the state conviction cases,
or by squarely holding that the use of a coerced confession violates the selfincrimination clause of the fifth amendment.1 3 It would appear, therefore,
that the majority's position is in error and that the general rule permitting
collateral attack of a conviction based on a denial of defendant's constitutional rights should be applicable in the principal case.
This general rule, however, is qualified by the requirement that the
taking of an appeal is a condition precedent to seeking collateral relief on
any grounds.14 The crucial issue in the principal case is whether an exception to this requirement may be made when the failure to appeal is excusable. The majority opinion answered in the negative. A significant
number of federal habeas corpus cases have, however, overlooked or expressly excused the failure to appeal and permitted collateral attack notwithstanding such failure.15 Three of these cases, in which federal convictions
involving alleged denials of constitutional rights were not appealed, are
pertinent and illustrative. Bowen v. Johnston16 raised the important and
theretofore unsettled question whether the state or federal government had
criminal jurisdiction over national parks. The Supreme Court expressly
held that because of these "exceptional circumstances" the failure to appeal
would be excused. Johnson v. Zerbst1 1 held that a hearing must be granted
13 If this hypothesis is rejected the availability in federal courts of relief by collateral
attack for a prisoner convicted by a coerced confession would depend on whether he had
been convicted in a state or federal court; this would place the higher federal courts in
the anomalous position of being able to correct state convictions but not those of their
own lower courts.
14 Sunal v. Large, 32 U.S. 174 (1947); Adams v. United States ex rel. l\IcCann, 317
U.S. 269 (1942) (dictum); Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420 (1912); Harlan v. McGourin,
218 U.S. 442 (1910). This failure-to-appeal rule was judicially created and is not part
of the statutory language of § 2255. The common expression of the rule is that "habeas
corpus proceedings may not be used as a substitute for appeal."
15 The following cases expressly excused the failure to appeal from state convictions
and permitted collateral attack: Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (pica of guilty and
no counsel); Craynor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955) (although no state appeal
perfected, state court had allowed petition for habeas corpus); Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F.2d
586 (5th Cir. 1931) (alleged mob domination of trial and impossibility of filing for
appeal until after date set for e.xecution); Yohyowan v. Luce, 291 Fed. 425 (E.D. Wash.
1923) (state trial court had no jurisdiction over petitioner, an Indian, and petitioner had
no money for an appeal). In the following cases federal convictions were under collateral
attack and hearings were granted in spite of the fact that no appeal had been taken:
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (facts concerning alleged coerced plea of guilty
were dehors the record and therefore could not have been corrected on appeal); Bowen
v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939) (federal trial court allegedly without jurisdiction); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (alleged unconstitutional denial of counsel); Council v.
Clemmer, 165 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (same); Reid v. Sanford, 42 F. Supp. 300 (N.D.
Ga. 1941) (same). The significance of these cases lies not in whether petitioner was
successful in the collateral attack of his conviction, but in the fact that despite there
being no appeal, a collateral attack was permitted. The principal case and the present
analysis involve only the question of whether a hearing will be allowed.
16 306 U.S. 19 (1939).
11 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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where petitioner alleged that he had been deprived of his constitutional
right to counsel since the absence of counsel was sufficient to excuse the
failure to appeal.18 Perhaps the most significant case is Council v. Clemmer.19 There petitioner had counsel during his trial but argued that his
failure to appeal was excusable because he had relied upon his attorney's
assurance that an appeal would be prosecuted and that he did not learn
of the attorney's failure to appeal until after the time limit had elapsed.20
The above cases show that under certain circumstances the failure to appeal
may be excused and a collateral attack permitted. The holding in the principal case that even an "excusable" failure to appeal bars a motion under
section 2255 is, therefore, demonstrably in error.21
The questions remain, however, what will be sufficient to excuse the
failure to appeal and whether the facts in the principal case bring it within
the excusable category. As the above three cases suggest, the failure-toappeal rule appears to be only one of several factors which courts have
considered in deciding whether to permit collateral attack when there
has been no appeal. Each case involved, as a second factor, either an important unsettled question of law which the court felt should be decided or
an alleged denial of a basic constitutional right: in Bowen, an important
question of federal-state criminal jurisdiction; in Zerbst, an alleged violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel; in Council, an argument
that denial of counsel at the arraignment violated the sixth amendment.
Another factor is the balance which must be struck between the quest for
justice on the one side and finality of judicial proceedings and the economizing of the courts' time on the other.22 The Zerbst and Council cases
18 In discussing petitioner's failure to appeal, Mr. Justice Black said, "Urging that after conviction -he was unable to obtain a lawyer; was ignorant of the proceedings
to obtain new trial or appeal and the time limits governing both; and that he did not
possess the requisite skill or knowledge properly to conduct an appeal, he says that it was
- as a practical matter -impossible for him to obtain relief by appeal. If these contentions be true in fact, it necessarily follows that no legal procedural remedy is available
to grant relief for a violation of constitutional rights, unless the courts protect petitioner's
right by habeas corpus." Id. at 467.
19 165 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
20 In granting the hearing the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
the same court which in the present case holds that even an excusable failure to appeal
bars collateral relief, said, "The time for appeal is relatively brief, and we have accepted
appellant's explanation of his failure to appeal from the judgment of the trial court in
order that the more substantial contentions raised herein may be given proper attention."
Id. at 251. (Emphasis added.)
21 The majority opinion places heavy reliance on United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S.
220 (1960), which held that since the filing of a notice of appeal within ten days is a
jurisdictional requirement the period for taking an appeal may not be enlarged although
the failure to appeal was excusable. The dissenting opinion, principal case at 862-63,
seems to be correct in insisting that this direct appeal case is not authority for denying a
collateral attack hearing. On the contrary, the very purpose of habeas corpus is to terminate wrongful detention resulting from errors which were not or could not be corrected
on appeal. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
22 These institutional expediencies seem to have greatly influenced the court in the
principal case. Principal case at 860.
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demonstrate that whether the petitioner had any real, practical opportunity to take an appeal is the final, potent factor in such a decision. The
court in the principal case was in error when it treated the failure-to-appeal
rule as an invariable bar to collateral attack rather than as a surmountable
hurdle. And, if the proper test of balancing all the relevant considerations
is applied, the court appears also to have reached the wrong result. Facts
were alleged which, if true, indicated not only the denial of a basic constitutional right and the presence of an important question of law, but also
indicated the absence of any real opportunity to appeal. Under such circumstances the remaining considerations of economy of judicial time and
the finality of legal proceedings must surely bow to the very real possibility
of an unconstitutional deprivation of human liberty.

Harvey 0. Mierke, Jr.

